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I. Introduction
The Unemployed Philosophers Guild began as an online retailer selling
Sigmund Freud-related merchandise, such as the ever-popular Freudian
Slippers.1 Expanding from Freud paraphernalia, the site expanded to offer
a wide array of intellectual kitsch, headlined by their line of Little Thinkers:
plush dolls of famous intellectuals, such as deities (Buddha, Jesus),
philosophers (Nietzsche, Socrates), scientists (Charles Darwin, Galileo),
political revolutionaries (Ch Guevara, Eleanor Roosevelt), writers (Jane
Austen, Oscar Wilde), and artists (Salvador Dali, Vincent Van Gogh),
among others.2  Responding to inquires asking why they did not offer a
broader selection of personalities, the retailer replied that "many fictional
and historical figures, especially those from the 20th century, [were] not in
the public domain, which prevent[ed] us from reproducing their likeness.",
3
This online retailer's practices of profiting from the persona of famous
people and the limitations imposed on them illustrate the current status and
debate of publicity rights in the United States and what is at stake for the
future. Though the Unemployed Philosophers Guild specializes in selling
merchandise based upon the likenesses and other unique aspects of famous
philosophers' personas (such as Pavlov's Dog or Schrfdinger's Cat),4 their
business bases itself upon the commercial appropriation of personality.
Noted scholar J. Thomas McCarthy defined the right of publicity by
stating:
The Right of Publicity is simply this: the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.
This legal right is infringed by unpermitted use which damages
the commercial value of this inherent human right of identity and
which is not immunized by principles of free press and free
speech.5
1. The Unemployed Philosophers Guild [hereinafter UPG], "Freudian Slippers," http://
www.philosophersguild.com/index.lasso?page-mode=ProductDetail&cat=freud&
skip=0&item=0977 (last visited March 30, 2008).
2. UPG, "Little Thinker Dolls," http://www.philosophersguild.com/index.lasso?page
_mode=Home&category=Little%20Thinker (last visited March 30, 2008).
3. UPG, "Frequently Asked Questions (Really)," http://www.philosophersguild.com/
index.lasso?page-mode=faq (last visited March 30, 2008).
4. UPG, "Pavlov's Dog," http://www.philosophersguild.conindex.lasso?page-mode=
ProductDetail&cat=-best&skip=23&item=0 151 (last visited March 30, 2008); UPG,
"Schr6dinger's Cat," http://www.philosophersguild.com/index.lasso?page-mode = ProductDetail
&item=0152 (last visited March 30, 2008).
5. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, § 1:3 (Thompson West 2d
ed. 2007).
I'M A HIGHWAY STAR
Though federal and state courts have not settled on what the publicity
right specifically entails,6 all publicity rights protect the commercial use of
specific indicia of a specific human being.7 Evolving from the right of
privacy, the right of publicity in the United States is a sui generis
individual right that incorporates various torts and intellectual property
rights.8
However, courts have had trouble grappling with this evolving right, as
they have use muddled reasoning to explain the justifications for the right's
existence, 9 the nature of the right, 10 and the interactions with other
established rights of privacy and intellectual property." As there is no
federal right of publicity, more than half of the states in the union have
either codified their own version of a publicity right, or their courts have
recognized a common law right of publicity. 12 This has created problems
both for potential appropriators of persona, who incur extra costs associated
with figuring out the type of licenses necessary for use of specific indicia in
each state, and for individuals possessors of persona, who control only
specific aspects of their personality based almost solely upon the where
they reside or where potential harm takes place.
The federal government has the authority to create and manage a
federal right of publicity.' 3  Though it may not have the authority to
preempt state laws regarding the right of publicity, a federal law that
clearly outlines important details about the justification behind the right,
the nature, scope and contours of the right, and the right's interaction with
other established laws will give states proper guidance in the crafting of
6. See, e.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir. 2005); White v. Samsung
Elec. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. Julius C.S. Pinckaers, From Privacy Toward a New Intellectual Property Right in
Persona, § 1.1 (Kluwer Law Int'l, 1996); See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46
(1995).
8. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1:7.
9. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right into the Right of Publicity?, 9
DEPAUL-LCA ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 35, 47-49 (1998).
10. Compare Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(finding that publicity rights were property and therefore were descendible) with Comment,
Inheritahility of the Right of Publicity Upon the Death of the Famous, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1251,
1255 (1980) (arguing that deeming publicity rights as property and therefore descendible leads to
"questionable syllogisms").
11. See e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 5:4 (illustrating the "map of the 'legal
neighborhood' of the law regarding use of personal identity," including intellectual property
rights like trademarks, copyrights, and misappropriation, Prosser's four torts of privacy,
defamation, and false advertising).
12. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45-47 (1995); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 6:3-6:8 (right of publicity recognized in some form by 28 states).
13. See Section II.C, infra.
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their own publicity rights. 14  Such a federal law will more importantly
guide both state and federal courts on how to deal with future issues
regarding publicity rights. By specifically outlining the justifications and
contours of the publicity right, Congress can grapple with the constitutional
implications and other interactions with established federal laws of privacy
and intellectual property. 5 Clearly balancing the private rights connected
to the right of publicity against the public rights in uncontrolled
appropriation will provide clarity in this area of the law and prevent the
chilling effect that occurs with uncertainty. Such clarity and firm
foundational jurisprudence will help individuals trying to extract
commercial value from their own personalities and potential users of such
personality by setting a legal foundation upon which to draft meaningful
legal agreements.
In Part II of this article, I detail some of the justifications for a publicity
right and why some justifications are more important for a modem federal
publicity right. I then discuss how Congress has constitutional authority to
regulate the right of publicity used in interstate commerce, though states
retain the authority to regulate publicity rights at the intrastate level. In
Part III, I discuss some of the characteristics of the publicity right, such as
who may own and be the subject of such a right, how publicity rights can
be exploited, and how long the right lasts. Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss
the requisite balance between publicity rights and the rights of the public,
namely the First Amendment freedom of speech and how this balancing
limits the scope of the right of publicity. Through this analysis, the
framework outlined in the paper can serve as a proper foundation for
legislation that would protect the right of publicity using definitional
balancing at a federal level.
II. Justifications for a Federal Publicity Right
The publicity right recognizes value in the commercial appropriation of
persona.16 The federal government already regulates related intellectual
property rights in areas like federal trademark and federal unfair
competition laws, which also serve to protect the value of certain intangible
property used in commerce. 17 The economic justifications behind publicity
14. The Lanham Act only regulates marks in commerce (15 U.S.C. § 1127) that Congress
could lawfully regulate, while state trademark laws closely follow the language of the Lanham
Act to regulate intrastate trademark usage. See generally, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
ASSOCIATION (INTA), STATE TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (1NTA 2008)
(outlining state trademark acts, "Baby FTC" acts, and right of publicity laws for each state).
15. See Parts III-IV, infra.
16. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
rights and the federal government's exclusive authority over only interstate
economic activity may still allow states to shape their own publicity laws,
as the states may still regulate intrastate economic activity.'
8
A majority of courts see the right of publicity as a right granted to
every person (not just celebrities) that allows them to control the
commercial use of their identity and recover in court from those that take
such portions of identity without authorization.19 Given its evolution from
privacy law and correlation to various intellectual property laws, courts
view publicity right violations as both torts (as the misappropriation is
considered unfair competition) and infringements of intellectual property
rights.20 As this section illustrates, courts and scholars have used multiple
rationale to justify the existence and breadth of the publicity right. 2' The
fitfulness of these justifications shapes the language, nature and scope of
the publicity right.
A. Economic Justifications
One of the traditional economic justifications for publicity rights stems
from the concept of allocative efficiency.22 This theory states that if a
resource could be used without restraint, the resource would be depleted
until it held no value; this is commonly known as the "Tragedy of the
Commons., 23 Creating artificial scarcity for a commodity like an image
through the use of an exclusive right of publicity preserves the value of the
image to the owner, who controls the consumption of the image, potential
users of that image-who would pay the owner to allow them use of the
image-and consumers, who rely upon the image in a commercial
context. 24 Critics of this justification argued that this economic efficiency
justification for monopolies was inapplicable to information markets due to
the fact that an individual's use does not necessarily decrease the
availability or value of the information good to others, and individuals
18. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 2; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)
(defining categories of activity Congress may regulate under its commerce power).
19. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 1.3.
20. Id. at § 1.7.
21. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1180 (2006).
22. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2.7; Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L.
REv. 393, 411 (1978).
23. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
24. Matthews v. Wozencraf, 15 F.3d 432, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1026 (5th Cir.
1994).
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would also still create such indicia of persona without the benefit of a
publicity right.
Case law has shown, however, that most courts do not discuss
allocative efficiency and the preservation of scarce resources, but rather
cite the economic incentive to invest in persona as the main justification for
the existence of a publicity right.26 Similar to the utilitarian justification for
patents and copyrights as economic inducements,27 the exclusive economic
right of publicity is seen as a necessary step to induce people to venture
into the public stage and invest in producing a distinct public persona who
absent such a right, would otherwise decide not to enter the public arena. 8
As debate over the validity of the economic inducement argument has been
ongoing in the established fields of patent and copyright law,29 such debate
has also been mirrored over the right of publicity. Scholars have attacked
this rationale as an inapplicable extension of the utilitarian justification to
fields that do not require inducement, stating, "[n]ot a shred of empirical
data exists to show that [celebrities] would ... invest less energy and
talent" without the publicity right.30  Also, this justification does not
address the rights of non-celebrities and celebrity recluses, who may
specifically avoid the use of their personas in commercial exploitations.
Nonetheless, courts seem to agree that the public benefits when people are
induced to develop special skills that in turn could be used for commercial
advantage, even if others would act without such inducement.
25. Robin Gross, Intellectual Property Rights and the Information Commons, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY 107 (MIT Press, 2006); Mark A. Lemley, Ex
Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U CHI. L. REV. 129, 143 (2004).
26. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 5, § 2.6.
27. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and the Useful Arts."')
28. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2.6.
29. This debate has been ongoing even in light of the fact that the constitutional clause that
grants Congress authority to award copyrights and patents cites the utilitarian inducement
argument as justification. Copyright and Patent Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To
promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). See, e.g.,
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press, 2008); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5,
§ 2.6.
30. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1187 (quoting Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting
Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants
Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283, 307 (2000)).
31. Matthews, 15 F.3d at 437.
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B. Moral Rights
Stemming from its foundations in the right of privacy, publicity rights
have also inherited various non-economic justifications that focus on the
importance of maintaining human dignity.32 Though these justifications are
more disparate than the economic justifications for property, these
justifications all focus on the mental harm inflicted on a person through the
unauthorized use of personality.33 These justifications, however, do not
support established remedies for infringement of the right, such as past
royalties or profits, as they stem from exclusive rights associated with
property.34
John Locke's labor theory of property is a subset of natural property
rights theory that claims a person's expenditure of labor justifies a claim of
ownership over the resultant product. 35 Serving as the foundation for other
IP rights justifications, such as the "sweat of the brow" rationale behind
early copyright jurisprudence,36 this fundamental rationale for natural
property rights rests upon three assumptions: (1) every man has a right to
his own person, (2) every man has a right to own the labor of his person;
and (3) every man has a right to own that which he has mixed his labor
with.37  The culmination of these assumptions is that every person is
entitled to the fruits of one's own labors.38
Critics of the natural rights justification, however, point out that fame
is not solely a result of an individual's efforts, but is rather a collaborative
effort.39 As such, strict adherence to natural rights theory would prohibit
the value of the resultant fame going exclusively to the subject of fame.4 °
32. See, e.g., Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
216 (1954) (advocating natural labor rights argument); M.P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity
and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 285 (2005) (advocating right of
publicity as right of self-definition).
33. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 196 (1890).
34. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1181-82; Richard A. Posner, supra note 22, at
411 (noting that an alienable property right would be an incorrect response to problems with
commercialization of identity).
35. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government §§ 25-51 (1690).
36. Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 1533 (1993); MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 1.7
(LexisNexus 4th ed., 2005).
37. LOCKE, supra note 35, § 27.
38. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 835 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting);
Int'l News Service v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (using argument in outlining
misappropriation doctrine).
39. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1181; Michael Madow, Private Ownership of
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 184, 188 (1993).
40. Id.
2009]
While an author may be the sole contributor to his creative work and may
therefore acquire a monopoly in the form of a copyright, the same usually
cannot be said for the efforts required to acquire fame.4' If all individuals
have a natural right to their labors, all those who helped to add value to
such fame should also have a stake in its value, as it is the fruits of their
labor as well.42 Because the value of the publicity right is not distributed
among all contributors, natural rights, and more specifically Lockean labor
theory of property, should not be used as a basis for an exclusive individual
right.43 Furthermore, fame is rarely, if ever, the primary result of any
action a person takes." Though an actor's or athlete's ultimate goal may
be higher notoriety or the formation of a unique persona, the immediate
goal is actually to win a game or effectively convey a part.45 As such, the
law does not need to protect secondary effects of such labor as strongly
when an individual already receives benefits from his efforts that are
protected by other laws.
Another justification for publicity rights stems from the tort of unjust
enrichment.46 Courts usually define unjust enrichment as a party receiving
a pecuniary advantage through no effort of his own at the expense of
another.47 Courts therefore rule that the recipient return the pecuniary
advantage to the rightful owner, even if the advantage was not obtained
illegally.48 Critics have shown, however, that this justification is subject to
circular logic. 49 If unjust enrichment is based on the taking of another's
right, the right does not simply exist because others try to take from it.
50
Put more succinctly, the fact that something has value does not itself make
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Huw Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, 294 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2002)
45. Id.; W.J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1547 (1993).
46. See e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977); Martin
Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc., v. Ain. Hertiage Prod., Inc., 250 Ga. 135 (1982) (J.
Weltner, concurring); see also Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1
U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REV. 97, 109 (1994).
47. Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A 'Haystack in a Hurricane', 55 TEMPLE L.Q. 977, 991
(1982); Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (1978).
48. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 11:34.
49. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 815 (1935); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 2:2.
50. Huw Beverley-Smith, The Commercial Appropriation of Personality, 313-14
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
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it property.51 Thus, while unjust enrichment may serve to justify specific
remedies for harm on property, it cannot itself serve as the basis for the
existence of such property.52
Some scholars have sighted the preservation of human dignity as a
moral justification for the publicity right.53 In these instances, courts have
noted that every human should have the right to develop his own identity.54
This justification relates closely to the justifications for the right of privacy,
which focuses on the infliction of mental distress. 55 Under this rationale,
courts look at the harm inflicted by a defendant's unauthorized exploitation
of an individual's persona, as such exploitation harms the dignity of the
56individual. However, this justification has fallen out of favor by most
courts, as it naturally precluded celebrities from collecting on claims
because their voluntary public exposure weakened claims of harm inflicted
by public exposure created by others,57 similar to the different standards
required for public and nonpublic figures for defamation and invasion of
privacy claims.58 In addition, personal injury does not justify recovery of
the economic value from an alienable right, as the harm inflicted does not
justify recovering the defendant's resultant pecuniary gain.59  As most
courts currently view publicity rights as property rights, justification for a
personal right does not serve an adequate basis for economic recovery of
lost profits.6 °
51. BEVERLEY-SMITH, supra note 50, at 278-79; see also Felix Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) ("[t]he vicious cycle
in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal protection upon economic value, when, as a
matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it
will be legally protected").
52. PINCKAERS, supra note 7, § 7.4[B]; Haas, Storehouse of Starlight: The First Amendment
Privilege to Use Names and Likenesses in Commercial Advertising, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 539
(1986).
53. See PINCKAERS, supra note 7, § 7.2; see also MURUMBA, COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION
OF PERSONALITY 132 (1986).
54. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 220 (1905).
55. Id.; see also M.P. McKenna, supra note 32, at 285.
56. E.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721 (9th Cir. 1992); Abdul-Jabbar
v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1996).
57. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941); Corliss v. E.W.
Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
58. Harte-Hanks Comm. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666-68 (1989).
59. Cf Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905); see Dogan &
Lemley, supra note 21, at 1182.
60. Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the
Uncharted Boundaries of the Right of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1324 (2002); Cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 (1995) (stating that damages can include
the greater of the individual's pecuniary loss or the defendant's own pecuniary gain resulting
from the appropriation).
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C. Federal Jurisdiction
In addition to the justification for the existence of a publicity right in
general, a federal publicity right needs a jurisdictional nexus between the
interests of the right and what Congress can constitutionally regulate.6'
Based on economic interests involved in the exploitation of personality,
one such nexus exists between the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, which grants Congress powers to regulate interstate
commerce, and the publicity rights that are used in interstate commerce.62
Much like Congress' authority to regulate trademarks and unfair
competition in interstate commerce, Congress' ability to regulate publicity
rights stems from the use of persona in activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. 63 As advertising campaigns, sale of merchandise, and
other exploitation of persona regularly cross state lines, the federal
government has authority to regulate such interstate economic activities.
However, as with trademarks, states still maintain the power to regulate
purely intrastate economic activities.64 While the Supremacy Clause of the
constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate interstate
commerce, 65 such power allows concurrent regulation based on the scope
of the economic activity.66 As a result, local exploitation would most likely
be subject to the state's existing laws on the subject.
Though Congress acting in the area may not result in complete
uniformity, a clear legislative history explaining the rationale behind a right
of publicity coupled with clear language balancing the interests of publicity
owners and the public may push states to draft language to coincide with
the national standard. Much like the "baby FTC" acts states adopted for
the state trade commissions to mirror the Federal Trade Commission, a
federal statute would serve as a clear model for states to adopt.67  In
addition, courts could use the federal statute as a guide when a state
publicity statute is silent on an issue. Furthermore, a federal standard
would also lower costs associated with acquiring licenses or assignments to
use personas in interstate commerce, which is of great importance given the
61. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000).
62. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
63. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining "commerce" as commerce that Congress can lawfully
control); Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
65. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
66. Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2006); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:2 (4th ed.) ("In general, federal
and state trademark and unfair competition law can coexist and cooperate without conflict.").
67. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204 (2003); MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2004).
These acts state in their legislative history that weight in the interpretation of the statute should be
given to Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and its judicial construction.
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pervasive interstate economic activities of the modem economy. Much like
the original intent behind the Commerce Clause, federal regulation on
interstate commerce would prevent states from enacting laws related to the
right of publicity that were either too broad or too weak, thus discouraging
parties from forum shopping.68 Though not a panacea, the federal nature of
the problem calls for a federal solution.
Il. Basic Characteristics of a Publicity Right
A federal statute establishing a general right of publicity would require
a clear delineation of rights, scope, defenses, and remedies in order to be
properly effective. Though states differ on such issues, clear rules backed
with proper rationale will make the federal statute illustrative and may
encourage states to rewrite their statutes to adhere to the federal standard,
or at least make deviations from the standard backed by clear legislative
and judicial reasoning.
A. Subject and Object of the Right
The subject and object of the right focus on the people who initially
receive the bundle of exclusive rights associated with the right of publicity
and what aspects of a persona constitute the right. Over time, a majority of
courts have agreed on how to limit the scope of these two elements of the
right.
1. Subject
The subject of the publicity right is one who receives protection by the
right. 69  A person who initially receives protection initially owns the
publicity right and has the positive exclusive rights to persona and the
negative rights to prohibit others from exploiting such rights.70 Though
earlier debates focused on whether to extend the right to non-humans, such
as animals, inanimate objects, or non-physical entities (like groups or
corporations), most states decided to only grant protection to humans.71
This decision coincides with the natural rights rationale that it is
humans who inherently are born with a unique persona, it is humans who
must invest in cultivating the growth of persona, and it is humans who can
68. See generally Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (discussing
the use of forum shopping to gain a competitive advantage during litigation).
69. PINCKAERS, supra note 7, § 2.4.
70. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
71. Compare Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1213 (D.C. Il. 1981)
(extending publicity right protection to a musical group) with Heinemann v. General Motors
Corp., 342 F. Supp. 203, 209 (D.C. Il. 1972) (refusing to extend right of publicity to a unique
automobile); Pinckaers, supra note 7, § 2.3[A].
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effectively control that persona.72 Though it is true that animals and other
entities may become famous, limiting the scope to humans does not leave
these entities fair game from unauthorized exploitation. Beyond the usual
remedies in other established rules against copyright infringement,
trademark infringement, and misappropriation, the humans that control
nonhuman entities can use their publicity rights in certain instances.73 For
example, individuals can pool their publicity rights together and control
them and a group.74 Though the justifications behind the right of publicity
tend to rely mostly upon economic rationale, the additional presence of
moral rationale effectively precludes the publicity right from being a
modified merchandising right and limits its subject exclusively to
humans.75 The majority of states also recognized this distinction and thus
limited the scope exclusively to humans.76
States have also tried to decide whether to extend the right of publicity
to all humans or merely celebrities or those who try to exploit such rights.77
Though the law should require the individual to cultivate their persona in
order to receive certain judicial remedies, all humans inherently have some
persona and therefore are born with an associated publicity right.78
Limiting the right of publicity exclusively to celebrities would not be useful
because all people have some inherent economic interest in their
personas. 79 Though celebrities are much more likely to bring actions under
a publicity right, that fact merely reflects the higher value of such rights.8s
72. MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 4:36; Pinckaers, supra note 7, § 2.3[B].
73. E.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Stallone, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (characters considered copyrightable subject matter).
74. See Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236 (E.D.
Pa. 1998) (All members of the Beatles assigned their publicity rights for name and likeness to
Apple Corps. so that the corporation was the proper party in suit).
75. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt. d (1995) ("The
interest of human dignity and autonomy that underlies both publicity and privacy rights limits the
application of the right of publicity to natural persons.").
76. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (defining the attributes of publicity in relation to
humans); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1) (prohibiting commercial use of name or likeness of any
natural person).
77. Compare, e.g., Lerman v. Chuckleberry Pub. Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) with Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n. 11 (9th Cir.
1974).
78. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824; Nimmer, supra note 32, at 216.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, cmt. d (1995) ("However, the
identity of even an unknown person may possess commercial value."); § 49, cmt. d ("Private
persons may also recover damages measured by the value of the use by establishing the market
price that the defendant would have been required to pay in order to secure similar services from
other private persons or from professional models.").
80. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824 ("Generally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the
identity appropriated, the greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered."); KNB
Enter. v. Matthews, 78 Cal. App. 4th 362, 367 (2d. Dist. 2000).
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It is not a valid basis to exclude others from having a property right merely
because it has a low value. As such, all humans are born with a persona
that is protected by as a publicity right.
2. Object
The object of the publicity right is the sum of attributes of a person that
creates an individual's persona.81 The intangible indicia of personality that
others help to identify a unique human being constitute an individual's
persona for the sake of defining the publicity right.82 This includes an
individual's name, voice, typical appearance and characterization.83 The
main limiting principal for which objects receive legal protection, however,
is that others must perceive the attribute as a unique identifier.84 This is so
others may freely use general human attributes that do not identify a
specific person and therefore do not cause harm to the individual. For
example, use of an individual's voice in a commercial may not infringe on
that person's right of publicity, whereas the use of John Facenda's voice,
"the voice of God," which he used to narrate NFL Films game footage and
highlight films for decades, 85 would potentially infringe, as others could
readily recognize his voice and categorize it as a unique identifier.
Though such a restriction seems to limit causes of action only to
celebrities, such constraint serves dual purposes. The first purpose behind
the restriction is that it limits the scope of infringement only to those where
others could reasonably identify a unique source.86 Similar to trademark
law,8v others need not identify the specific source, but merely recognize
that such indicia points to a unique persona. This drastically limits the
potential breath of the right, as it does not protect personality attributes that
81. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 4:46; see, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723,
728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity is that it
recognizes the commercial value of the picture or representation of a prominent person or
performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public reputation or
'persona."').
82. See White v. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
83. E.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (name); Waits
v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (voice); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets
Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (distinctive catch phrase).
84. E.g., Cheatam v. Paisano Pub., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 385 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (remedy
available to plaintiff is plaintiffs identity has commercial value, established by proof of (1) the
distinctiveness of the identity and (2) the degree of recognition of the person among those
receiving the publicity).
85. Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, [I don't have access to the Reporter; it's
section VI before A.] (3d Cir. 2008)
86. Motchenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1974);
Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining trademark as a mark to identify and distinguish his goods as
unique and indicate the source of goods, even if the source is unknown).
others do not recognize as unique. Though some attributes-such as name
and likeness-are almost always inherently unique and therefore protected,
such a restriction would give individuals incentive to invest in other
personality attributes so that others may see them as unique identifiers in
order to acquire value from such association.88
The second purpose behind the unique identifier restriction is that it
helps limit an individual's control over performance rights. Though
copyright law grants authors exclusive rights over the public performance
and display of their fixated works, it does not extend such protection over
the non-fixated portions of such performances. 89 For example, a musician
may control the live public performance of songs she wrote, 90 the public
performance of her sound recording, 9' and even the public screening of a
recorded live performance. 92 However, no law allows her to control non-
fixated aspects of such performance.93 This allows others to freely copy
non-fixated aspects of the original artist's performance without
compensation.94 Limiting the object of the publicity right only to those
aspects that others can identify as unique effectively restricts a potentially
unwieldy power to control all performances of certain creative works.
Such limitations similarly encourage individuals to cultivate a unique
performance persona separate from the underlying work so that others
could uniquely identify their performance and therefore associate value
with such performance.
B. Exploitation and Duration
The exploitation and duration of publicity rights relate to the extent to
which and individual can acquire value through the use of the right and for
how long the owner of the right can collect rents. Here, the muddled
foundation supporting the right of publicity creates problems because
personal rights share different legal characteristics than property rights in
88. See Section ILA, supra.
89. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)-(6) with 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (fixation requirement).
90. Subject to the compulsory licensing scheme set out in 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2005).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2000).
93. Classic examples of non-fixated performances include unrecorded performances, such
as improvised musical acts or unrecorded choreographic work. Congress recently passed 17
U.S.C. § 1101 to comply with TRiPs (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights), which created a right of live musical performances. There is a question of
whether Congress has the power to grant such a right to performers. Compare United States v.
Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) with KISS Catalog v. Passport Int'l Prods., 350
F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
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these areas. 95 The choice of character between property and personal rights
greatly affects how individuals can manipulate a right of publicity as will
be discussed below.
1. Exploitation
Exploitation is the extent to which owners can collect rents from the
right of publicity through such actions like the grant of license, consent, or
assignment. A crucial difference between personal rights, such as the right
of privacy, and property rights like copyrights and patents is that property
rights are freely assignable, while personal rights are non-assignable.96
Modem jurisprudence and economic justifications for publicity rights lead
to the conclusion that the publicity right should be treated as a property
right and therefore should have characteristics associated with property
rights, such as the ability to be fully assignable, or be licensed in part or
whole. 97  Moral rights, while still an important foundation of publicity
rights, do not preclude their treatment as property, as other intellectual
property rights have causes of action that stem from moral rights without
changing their primary nature as property rights.98
The value of assignment in particular stems from the economic
justifications of both allocative efficiency and inducement. 99 The ability to
transfer rights increases the value of the right to the individual, as he can
charge higher fees for such a sale and therefore has a higher incentive to
invest in his persona. Allowing assignments also increases allocative
efficiency, as individuals are able to transfer their rights to other entities to
more efficiently control transactions involving the right. This transfer
could be minor, as when the individual band members of a musical group
transfer their individual publicity rights to a single corporation that would
control licensing the publicity rights of the band, °00 or it could potentially
be similar to ASCAP-like licensing for musical compositions, where
clearinghouses helped potential licensees incur less-costly searches because
such sales were controlled by a single entity and licensees had a single
95. E.g., Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 406 (1960) (avoiding to argue whether the
right of publicity should be classified as "property" by simply referring to it as a "right of value").
96. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 30-33 (3d ed. 1986).
97. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:8; see, e.g., Acme Circus Operating Co., Inc. v.
Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (1 lth Cir. 1983);
98. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 10:9 ("The notion of a right being intellectual 'property'
and its infringement a 'tort' is not unusual. For example, a trademark may be viewed as
'property' and its infringement as a commercial 'tort."').
99. See Section ILA, supra.
100. See Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236 (E.D.
Pa. 1998).
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place to search and receive licensees for use from a large group of
owners. 101
Treatment of the right of publicity as property may lead to other
problems associated with property rights, as treatment of one's persona as a
commodity may allow others to seize control of it in legal proceedings,
such as during divorce, in the debtor-creditor system, or used by the
government in determining tax liability. 10 2 Such exploitations may require
specific exemptions that would prevent courts from forcing the subject to
relinquish their publicity rights, as would otherwise be the case in debtor-
creditor disputes. °3 However, the dignitary interests usually involved in
the forced sale of persona probably would not outweigh the economic
interests involved. 10 4  These questions coincide with other issues in
intellectual property rights, such as whether the right must be sold in
conjunction with other rights, how intellectual property rights should be
taxed or insured, and when others can forcibly reach the value of the
property right. 10 5 These issues, however, should not dissuade drafters from
treating the publicity right as property and granting a similar bundle of
transfer rights.
2. Duration
One main difference that separates intellectual property rights like
copyrights and patents from trademarks and trade secrets is duration.
While modem copyrights and patents are valid for an easily discernible,
fixed duration,' 0 6 modem trademarks and trade secrets are valid in
perpetuity as long as certain criteria are met.10 7 The characteristics of the
publicity right make it more closely related to the fixed-duration rights of
copyrights and patents. As all humans initially have a publicity right, there
are no criteria that a person must meet in order to acquire or maintain such
a right.'08 The extra criteria for trademarks and trade secrets serve a
101. Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property
Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 177 (2008) (discussing the ASCAP blanket licensing scheme
for mechanical licenses).
102. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 60, at 1338-57.
103. Id. at 1360-61.
104. Id. at 1361-65.
105. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 60, at 1338-57; see e.g., Estate of Andrews v. U.S.,
850 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Va. 1994).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000) (duration of works created on or after January 1, 1978); 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (term of issued patent).
107. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-59, 1128 (2000); Uniform Trade Secret Act (USTA) § 1. See
also I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:3
(4th ed.).
108. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, §§ 4:14, 5:10.
gatekeeping function that allows property that would otherwise remain
private indefinitely to enter the public domain.109 Alternatively, once valid,
copyrights and patents do not have major additional criteria that owners
have to meet in order to keep the property valid.110 Therefore, drafters of
the Copyright and Patent Acts balanced the private and public rights by
setting a fixed duration.111 Though there is a requirement that others
identify the persona as unique, this is a lower continual requirement than
those for valid trademarks and too low a threshold to properly balance
private and public rights.
The actual duration of a publicity right would be a bit more arbitrary.112
The major point of contention throughout states is whether the right should
extend beyond the death of the original owner.11 3 While the personal right
of privacy dies along with the individual,' 14 intellectual property rights may
extend beyond the death of the originator. Patents have a fixed duration
independent of the life of the inventor. 1 5 Copyrights are currently valid for
the life of the owner, plus seventy years after his death.1 16 The rationale
behind the copyright duration was to secure value to the owner during his
life and the owner's immediate heirs after his death.' 17 A fixed duration
after death provides value to the owner due to the copyright maintaining
value after death and also serves as a warning signal to assignees and
licensees, who have a fixed date where the right will no longer have
value.1 1 8  As the owner can adjust his use of the work based on the
knowledge that it would no longer have value after a certain date, the post-
mortem fixed duration adds predictability and therefore adds value to the
property right. Such added predictability should also extend to publicity
rights, given their close correlation with a specific person and similar
incentives to allow the subject and his heirs to reap the property value.
109. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a) (2000) (renewal of trademark registration).
110. E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-404 (2000) (notice requirement for copyrighted works).
111. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
112. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 9:16.
113. Compare, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3344-3344.1 (The Astaire Celebrity Image Protection
Act) (creates descendible publicity right) with Pirone v. MacMillan Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1990) (NY law terminates publicity rights at death); see generally T.P. Terrell and J.S. Smith,
Publicity, Liberty and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the
Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1 (1985); P.L. Felcher and E.L. Rubin, The Descendibility of
the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980).
114. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 6521 (1977).
115. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
116. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302-03 (2000).
117. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 134-35 (1976).
118. Id.
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The actual duration after death, however, does not have to be as long as
that of copyright. Though the actual duration of copyright already stands
as a heated point of contention,1 9 the justification for an extended duration
after death is not as strong for persona as it is for creative works. Publicity
rights differ from copyrights mainly because they are a secondary
consequence of a person's actions.120 While Congress has a constitutional
edict to promote "Science and the Useful Arts," there is no similar decree
to promote economic activities through individual property rights in
persona. Though an extended period adds value to a persona, the
secondary nature of such persona usually means that an individual is
gaining value from other investments and efforts for which he is already
being compensated. Given this secondary nature, the publicity right does
not need to mirror the duration of copyright. Drafters should set a specific
date that would adequately balance private rights and public rights.
Leaving such decisions for courts to decide on an ad hoc basis introduces
uncertainty to the process, and thereby reduces the value of the persona.
121
Though setting a relatively short, specific duration (e.g., twenty years after
death) is at best arbitrary, it serves as a predictable duration for the
publicity right to last.
IV. Questions About Content
The major points of contention between owners and the public come
forth in relation to what content publicity rights owners may control. 122 In
this context, content is how people may make commercial uses of an
individual's personality. 123 This mainly springs forth in debate on how to
properly balance the private interests related to the protection of persona
against the public interests in the use of such identifiers in unrestricted
speech.1 24 However, the muddled nature of the origins of publicity rights
makes such simple balancing untenable, as there is no clear precedent to
119. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
120. See supra note 45.
121. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 9:16.
122. Compare Comedy III Prod. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808-10 (Cal. 2001);
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1989); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc.
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982); ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); see generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. REv. 903, 908-13 (2003).
123. PINCKAERS, supra note 7, § 9.1.
124. Cf Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (private property rights of
owner outweighed First Amendment free speech rights of protesters to trespass in private
shopping center).
state which interests are stronger and for what reasons.125 Furthermore,
modem development of the law has evolved alongside the evolution of
commercial speech.12 6  While other intellectual property rights like
trademark and copyright were first recognized before the recognition of
commercial speech, commercial speech is now afforded First Amendment
protection. 127 Therefore, new statutes must clearly delineate what
appropriations are prohibited in light of this new class of speech and
properly justify these prohibitions in light of modem First Amendment case
law.
A. First Amendment Protection
The First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting an
individual's freedom of speech. 28  Any regulation that restricts speech
based on its content is presumed constitutionally invalid and even when
First Amendment protection of content is not total, the government cannot
restrict such speech based on the underlying message being expressed. 29 If
the First Amendment protects a given form of speech fully, courts use strict
scrutiny to examine whether the content-based regulation is still valid.'3 °
In order to pass strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the speech
falls into a class of restricted speech, or must demonstrate that the
regulating law satisfies a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest.
13 1
1. The Basis for Regulating Speech
In terms of intellectual property rights, the government allows
restriction of speech for multiple reasons. In terms of copyrights, for
example, the Copyright Clause of the Constitution gives the government a
125. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, § 8:23 (outlining the use of ad-hoc balancing to weigh
First Amendment interest against other private interests in publicity right infringement cases with
varying results).
126. See Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 737 (2007).
127. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
128. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
129. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 386 (1992) (finding that a regulation may
still violate the First Amendment if it makes distinctions among subcategories which cannot be
justified).
130. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622. 642 (1994).
131. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991).
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compelling interest in encouraging the production of creative works. 132
This compelling interest allows copyright regulations to withstand strict
scrutiny in the face of the First Amendment.' 33 Trademark's regulation of
commercial speech faces a more lax standard, 134 as commercial speech
receives less protection from the First Amendment.' 35  In addition,
Congress passed the Lanham Act almost three decades before the courts
recognized commercial speech as a protected class. 136  This resulted in
courts being much more accepting of such restrictions.1
37
Just as trademark laws do not have the same compelling state interest
to impose content-based restrictions on speech, publicity laws do not have a
proper constitutional justification or compelling governmental interest to
impose content-based restrictions. 138  Courts must therefore find that
publicity rights laws are either content-neutral restrictions on speech, legal
restrictions on commercial speech, or mere regulations of non-protected
speech. However, jurisprudence in trademark law may not serve as the
best model, 139 as courts allow restrictions on noncommercial use of
trademarks in certain instances. 140  As publicity rights were not widely
recognized before the protection of commercial speech, courts are not
likely to grant similar leeway. Therefore, legislation must account for such
protection when imposing restrictions on speech.
132. U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual
Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUs. L. REV. 697, 713
(2003).
133. See Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977) (finding that copyright's idea-expression dichotomy provides a definitional
balance between the interests of the First Amendment and the Patent and Copyright Clause).
134. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980);
135. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[Clommercial speech
may receive something less than the strict review afforded other types of speech.")
136. Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV.
1095, 1130 (2003). See Federal Trademark Act of 1946 ("Lanham Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (2000); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 749-50, 762-65 (1976).
137. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989); Posadas de P.R.
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
138. Volokh, supra note 132, at 702-12; Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
230-31 (1987).
139. Ramsey, supra note 136, at 1138; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 219-20 (1998).
140. E.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536
(1987); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-68 (1972).
2. Publicity Rights as a Content-Neutral Restriction on Speech
Publicity rights would have the broadest protection if courts deemed
these regulations content-neutral restrictions on speech. A content-neutral
regulation restricts speech by merely regulating the time, place, or manner
of such speech.' 41  Though courts regularly use the "time, place, or
manner" test set forth in O'Brien when analyzing copyright and trademark
restrictions, 142 scholars have argued that these restrictions are in fact
content-based regulations because they prohibit the content of a
defendant's expression and have defenses like fair use that are based on the
content of the expression.1 43  Granting rights that prohibit a potential
defendant's speech from using certain indicia of personality in commercial
communications in effect regulates the content of the expression.1
44
Therefore, it is a content-based restriction on speech.
3. Publicity Rights as a Restriction on Nonspeech
Other content-based speech restrictions are constitutional because they
restrict unprotected classes of speech like defamation and obscenity.
145
Trademark law usually allows content-based restrictions in many areas
because courts deem misleading and deceptive advertising as nonspeech.
146
However, the courts allowed such content-based restrictions because they
found that such regulations merely regulated the nonspeech element of
communication. 47  Allowing such restrictions in light of publicity rights
would require courts to find that such communications by their nature are
unprotected speech, or that the core principles of First Amendment analysis
141. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
142. E.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 536-41.
143. Robert N. Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV.
131, 145-46 (1989); Volokh, supra note 139, at 702-12.
144. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) ("[C]ontent-neutral speech
restrictions are those that are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.");
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d 860, 872 (1979) (right of publicity cannot
justify content-based restrictions on political or artistic expression where the identity of the holder
of the right bears a reasonable relationship to the message).
145. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.
146. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-
72 (1976) ("We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with [the] problem [of
deceptive or misleading commercial speech]. The First Amendment, as we construe it today,
does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow[s]
cleanly as well as freely."); Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protections of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV.
158, 165 (1982) ("The regulation of such deceptive or misleading commercial speech presents no
constitutional difficulties..
147. Id. at 383.
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require a lowered scrutiny for this class of speech. 148  In the case of
publicity rights, courts would have to deem that the speech portion of the
communication and the nonspeech harmful act (here, unauthorized
appropriation of persona) effectively merged so that the regulations are
only restricting conduct, not speech. 149 However, there is no merger of
speech and act in these cases that would require the regulation of speech in
order to regulate the harmful act. As such regulations would not merely
regulate the nonspeech elements of communications that incorporate
persona, such communications should not receive a lower level of scrutiny
than other protected speech.
4. Publicity Rights as a Restriction on Commercial Speech
Commercial speech is speech done on behalf of a company or an
individual with the intent of making a profit by proposing a commercial
transaction. 150 The current standard test for reviewing the constitutionality
of governmental regulations is a four-factor test set forth by the Court in
Central Hudson.I15 The court first determines whether the speech concems
lawful activity and is not misleading. 152  If found lawful and not
misleading, regulation of the speech is illegal unless (1) there exists a
substantial governmental interest, (2) the regulation directly and materially
advances that interest, and (3) the restriction is not more extensive than
necessary to serve the interests that support it. 153 Like the regulation of
trademarks, such regulations over publicity rights have to be narrowly
tailored to the interest at hand and require the least restrict means
available. 154 In regards to the balance between commercial speech rights
and publicity rights, commercial speech rights are of a lower class than
other protected speech. 155  In practical terms, the defense of
unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech is never raised, as
defendants never want to state that their unauthorized use of an individual's
persona to profit from commercial speech is protected because such speech
148. See, e.g., 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech, § 4:19 (2d ed.
2007).
149. H. Brian Holland, Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Standard
Restricting Speech that Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 385 (2005).
150. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
151. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999)
152. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
153. Id.
154. See Volokh, supra note 132, at 702-12 (arguing that trademark laws are content-based
restrictions on speech because they define the speech they prohibit based on the content of the
defendant's expression and have a content-based defense of fair use).
155. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396 (2001).
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is commercial in nature. 156 In fact, courts would likely favorably weigh the
individual property rights against the constitutional right of commercial
speech when faced with such balancing.
157
B. Definitional Balancing of Publicity Rights and Commercial Speech
The content that the publicity right protects must constitutionally
balance the rights of owners against the public interests of others wanting
to appropriate the use of indicia of persona. The law must therefore protect
owners' property rights to commercially exploit their own cultivated
personas against the public interests in free speech, which includes the
appropriation of these personas in both commercial and noncommercial
speech. 158  In light of the First Amendment, such balancing is only
constitutional if regulations only permit restrictions of nonspeech elements,
or if the government's interests otherwise outweigh the general public
interest in free speech. 159  A statute must therefore properly define the
classes of speech that the publicity right restricts and in what instances.
Because the publicity right, like other intellectual property rights,
generally imposes content-based restrictions on speech, such laws must
regulate either unprotected speech or less-protected classes of speech.
160
The appropriation of persona can therefore be used when such
appropriation is in effect nonspeech or when the regulation restricts
commercial speech and passes the Central Hudson test for the
constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions. Based on these criteria
the publicity right should restrict two separate areas of speech.
1. Use of Persona in False Endorsement
The first such area of speech-compelled speech through persona-
requires a constitutional balancing of the rights of individual owners
against the public. The Supreme Court has ruled that individuals cannot be
compelled to either speak that which they do not believe,16 1 nor shall they
be forced to use their property to convey a message they do not believe.
62
Thus the government has a compelling interest in quashing
156. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 7:3.
157. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 8:29.
158. See Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability
Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 84 (1994); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of
Publicity, 40 HotJS. L. REV. 903, 904-05 (2003).
159. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386.
160. See Section IV.A, supra.
161. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 544
U.S. 550 (2005).
162. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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communications that compel others to speak. 63 In the case of publicity
rights, this restriction would prohibit a defendant from using an
individual's persona to endorse or imply association with the message of
the communication. This restriction would require the owner of publicity to
prove that:
(1) consumers (or the general public) can identify the attribute's source
as unique,
(2) the use of the unique identifier was unauthorized,
(3) the use of the unique identifier suggested the subject's endorsement
or association with the message being conveyed in the communication.
Though such a requirement is similar to existing laws in trademark and
passing off,16 4 the elements allow for broader use than that allowed in
trademark. As this is a protection against compelled speech, the
compelling governmental interest in preventing compelled speech allows
the restriction to survive strict scrutiny, permitting content-based regulation
of both commercial and noncommercial classes of speech. This cause
could allow the owner to control a wide range of noncommercial speech
used in commercial contexts. Such a restriction would not reach all
communications, however, as consumers are not likely to believe that the
individual endorsed or was associated with a product or communication
merely because the unique identifier is present. 65  Such definitional
balancing properly balances the free speech rights of the individual against
the free speech rights of the public without being overly broad.
2. Commercial Speech
As the government can restrict the content of commercial speech if
such restriction passes the Central Hudson test,' 66 the publicity right can
restrict commercial speech in a narrow set of circumstances. Though
individuals have a property right in persona, scholars disagree on whether
the government has an independent substantial interest in order to pass the
first part of the Central Hudson test.' 67 However, the government likely
has a substantial interest in protecting the property interests of its citizens,
and laws restricting specific uses of such property can substantially and
directly advance such interests. 168 To meet the last requirement of the
163. See Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l)(A) (false endorsement).
165. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003) ("No
reasonable person could believe that merely because these photographs or paintings contain
[Tiger] Wood's likeness or image, they all originated with Woods.").
166. See Section IVA.4, supra.
167. Ramsey, supra note 136, at 1153.
168. See Tanner, 407 U.S. at 567.
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Central Hudson test, the regulation must properly balance the private and
public interests in the least restrictive way necessary to promote the
governmental interest.
1 69
Such a regulation would have to prohibit unauthorized use of persona
in commercial speech in instances that do not substantially adversely affect
public free speech rights. To achieve this goal, the publicity right can
borrow concepts from other intellectual property laws to balance such
public and private interests. Some of the main distinctions, like the
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright 170  and the requirement of
nonfunctionality in trademarks,1 71 separate unprotectable ideas from
protectable expression, as the public should be free to express the idea
without seeking approval from others. This concept of separability allows
owners to protect publicity rights without restricting the entire work. In the
case of publicity, this separation should be between essential mergers of
persona with the underlying work for the sake of conveying facts, and the
use of persona as a mere choice of creative expression."2 Such a
distinction would preclude individuals from prohibiting unauthorized
expressions of fact and ideas, such as for advertisements for the
individual's unauthorized biography, while prohibiting other commercial
products whose use of persona can be distinguished from the functionality
of the product.1 73 As this restriction is only limited to commercial speech,
the right would not prohibit works that courts see as regularly protected
speech. 174  As a result, individuals can control the use of commercial
products whose use of an individual's persona can be separated from the
functionality of the product. This effectively balances the individual
property rights against the public right of free speech.
V. Conclusion
The origins of, justifications for, and interactions with other intellectual
property laws have caused much debate about whether the publicity right
should exist and to what extent individuals should be able to use such a
169. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Leslie A. Kurtz, Speaking to the Ghost: Idea and Expression
in Copyright, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1221 (1993).
171. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995).
172. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness" Test for
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a
Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 62, 70 (2003-04).
173. Volokh, supra note 122, at 913, 923.
174. While there is a debate on whether merchandising is considered commercial speech,
such merchandise does not propose a commercial transaction and does not fit the definition of
commercial speech. Cf Dogan & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1175-78.
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right. Though states currently protect the right of publicity, a federal
standard will help the public by providing both a foundation of rights for
states to emulate, while also specifically outlining the precedence of a right
of publicity with other federal intellectual property rights and with other
constitutional concepts, such as the freedom of speech. Such a federal
statute is within Congress' scope because it has the power and authority to
regulate interstate commerce. Though a federal right of publicity does not
preempt state statutes regarding publicity within its borders, it can control a
great volume of economic activity that crosses state lines.
Federal publicity rights can help explain the need for such a right and
settle disputes about the scope and characteristics of the right. A federal
right of publicity should grant every human a right to the unique portions of
persona that he cultivates so others may see it as a unique identifier. He
should be able to treat such attributes as property and exploit such property
rights both during life and allow others to exploit this property right for a
fixed duration after his death. The right should only protect uses of
persona that either cause others to believe that the individual endorsed or
associated with the speech that use an attribute of his persona or when
someone uses such aspects of an individual's persona without authorization
in commercial speech when such use is not an essential idea or functional
aspect of the underlying product. Such a right of publicity adequately
balances the private property interests against the public free speech
interest within the modem constitutional framework.
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